Many are interested in longevity, cryonics, and uploading in an effort to preserve themselves.

I'd like to hear your personal definition of  'self.'

 

I think the human self is a pattern of neurochemical activity in the brain. Copy, model or preserve that in sufficient detail and you'd captured the self. Because the self is process, the physical substrate doesn't matter. The self could be captured in Tinker Toys or Legos provided you had enough room and time and weren't too concerned about reliability and speed.

I've never liked the term "uploading" to refer the process first described to me in Moravec's book. Uploading only means to transfer data or files from a local computer to a network of computers. I prefer the expression "brain taping" myself because it's more meaningful as to what's being done.

My definition of self, well I suppose it would be;

The entity created from the various neural archotypes.

Or I suppose in other words, the sum of it's parts.

Mr. Farlops:

I think the human self is a pattern of neurochemical activity in the brain. Copy, model or preserve that in sufficient detail and you'd captured the self. Because the self is process, the physical substrate doesn't matter. The self could be captured in Tinker Toys or Legos provided you had enough room and time and weren't too concerned about reliability and speed.

I've never liked the term "uploading" to refer the process first described to me in Moravec's book. Uploading only means to transfer data or files from a local computer to a network of computers. I prefer the expression "brain taping" myself because it's more meaningful as to what's being done.

So the copy of this observed mental process would be created for others as the original still dies? Or is the observed mental process being transported without corruption to another substrate? My take so far is that the former is the case.

Abolitionist:

Mr. Farlops:

I think the human self is a pattern of neurochemical activity in the brain. Copy, model or preserve that in sufficient detail and you'd captured the self. Because the self is process, the physical substrate doesn't matter. The self could be captured in Tinker Toys or Legos provided you had enough room and time and weren't too concerned about reliability and speed.

I've never liked the term "uploading" to refer the process first described to me in Moravec's book. Uploading only means to transfer data or files from a local computer to a network of computers. I prefer the expression "brain taping" myself because it's more meaningful as to what's being done.

So the copy of this observed mental process would be created for others as the original still dies? Or is the observed mental process being transported without corruption to another substrate? My take so far is that the former is the case.

Is there a difference?
Is a copy of a mind somehow less (or more) valuable than the original?
If I die, but a copy of me made last year lives, is it any different from me losing a year of memory?

I think the answer is no in all cases.

Assuming we could make a perfect copy of what we percieve to be the self?

There could definately be value in a copy of one's memories - though most of one's thoughts are not very useful to the rest of the world - there are concievably cases where it would be extremely beneficial to retrieve knowledge from a 'backup copy.'

I think a copy would be no value to you after death - though I think many would love a copy of themselves while they are still alive. Society may determine that there are applications for aspects of your copy when you are gone.

At the time when we have the technology to perform such feats - I think it's likely that our 'Darwinian-designed' thought processes will be seen as obsolete.

Personally, I wouldn't want to create a copy of myself. If we're going to create another being - why not use a better design - a more useful entity that does not suffer? I'd rather live with the knowlege that my useful attributes would be retained when I am gone.

Aside from the usual sentiment in the last part of your post, I agree.  A copy of myself will not be myself so there's not much point to it.  A copy of great thinkers or the drafters of a constitution however, would prove useful in clarifying disputed concepts.

The copy and the original would immediately diverge as unique experiences accumulated to each but each would have the subjective experience of being the original. Each would have the subjective experience of being a self.

There is a way to get around this last concern.

Instead of copying you, your brain is instead slowly replaced by synthetic neurons as the originals die off. These synthetic neurons might be more durable than the originals but, in all essential details, they process and communicate information in the same way the original ones do.

Once the last original neuron is replaced, many more options become availible to you, all without copying. Assuming there is no problem with David Chalmer's "Dancing Qualia" thought experiment, you shouldn't notice a thing.

ideal:

Aside from the usual sentiment in the last part of your post, I agree.  A copy of myself will not be myself so there's not much point to it.  A copy of great thinkers or the drafters of a constitution however, would prove useful in clarifying disputed concepts.

Which sentiment do you mean?

I think what is important here is how we choose to live our lives - is it really important for our happiness to live with the knowledge that some semblance of ourselves will live on? If so, perhaps there are better ways of achieving this peace_of_mind (which is another term for pleasure.)

Abolitionist:

Which sentiment do you mean?

I don't agree with your views on hedonism.

Mr. Farlops:

The copy and the original would immediately diverge as unique experiences accumulated to each but each would have the subjective experience of being the original. Each would have the subjective experience of being a self.

There is a way to get around this last concern.

Instead of copying you, your brain is instead slowly replaced by synthetic neurons as the originals die off. These synthetic neurons might be more durable than the originals but, in all essential details, they process and communicate information in the same way the original ones do.

Once the last original neuron is replaced, many more options become availible to you, all without copying. Assuming there is no problem with David Chalmer's "Dancing Qualia" thought experiment, you shouldn't notice a thing.

This is a method I have said I may go for, assuming I've already reached the end of my life.

I repeat the question: If I die, but a copy of me made last year lives, is it any different from me losing (more accurately, changing) a year of memory? The copy is conscious. It has my personality. It has my memories up to the point of copying. For all practical purposes, it's another, equally valuable instance of me. If I die a year after the copy is made, all I lose is that one year of memory. Of course, that would be regrettable - but much better than dying.

"I don't agree with your views on hedonism."

I always curious to hear a new point of view.

the copy believes it is me, but is programmed to live in the same Darwinian condition - though I think it might be difficult to keep the truth a secret from the copy, maybe not...

If I learned that I was a copy, I'd probably become psychotic.

It may be possible to replicate a neuron (seems likely that they are just complicated on/off switches) but for the copy to be identical it would have to have the same exact properties as the original in all aspects. Are there any theories about how the rest of the brain might be replicated?

Google search turns up many differing perspectives on the dancing qualia thought experiment.

I understand that these are theories to be put to the test and anything is possible.

 

Abolitionist:

the copy believes it is me, but is programmed to live in the same Darwinian condition - though I think it might be difficult to keep the truth a secret from the copy, maybe not...

I don't understand.

If I learned that I was a copy, I'd probably become psychotic.

Why? As I explained, being a copy doesn't make you any less valuable...

It may be possible to replicate a neuron (seems likely that they are just complicated on/off switches) but for the copy to be identical it would have to have the same exact properties as the original in all aspects. Are there any theories about how the rest of the brain might be replicated?

Don't know. It's just physics; it's possible to emulate, however hard.

Google search turns up many differing perspectives on the dancing qualia thought experiment.

I understand that these are theories to be put to the test and anything is possible.

The way I see it, Occam's razor suggests that carbon-basedness probably isn't important to consciousness at all - only information processing matters.