There are other people who will think differently. I am definitly one of them. I concider uploading to be the most important step in our evolution. I think that as an infomorph, I would have more freedom than in any other form.

Like many here, I am definitely of the opinion that our consciousness emerges from our neural processes, and since the matter in our brains is constantly changing, I see no reason why it would be impossible to upload oneself to another substrate. Functionally, replacing our biological neurons with artificial neurons is probably not much different than when old biological neurons die and are replaced by new biological neurons. I don't think anyone would argue that when one neuron dies, one's selfhood is lost and a new person is created. That is just silly. Therefore, at the very least, it should be possible to replace our neurons one by one and maintain whatever it is that creates one's selfhood.

Thus, since uploading certainly seems like a real possibility, it is a very desireable thing to workd towards. Uploading would create a whole new world of possibilities that were never before dreamed of.  Here is just a glimpse of the possibilities:

One could easily modify and upgrade one's own cognitive efficiency, ability, and capacity.  One could slow down one's subjective perception of time. One could communicate using methods beyond what we are capable of today. One could engineer and experience amazing virtual realities.  The possibilities seem endless

urchinstar47:

There are other people who will think differently. I am definitly one of them. I concider uploading to be the most important step in our evolution. I think that as an infomorph, I would have more freedom than in any other form.

similar to immersive virtual reality? I haven't seen the term infomorph before - could you elaborate?

AggressiveProgressive:

Like many here, I am definitely of the opinion that our consciousness emerges from our neural processes, and since the matter in our brains is constantly changing, I see no reason why it would be impossible to upload oneself to another substrate. Functionally, replacing our biological neurons with artificial neurons is probably not much different than when old biological neurons die and are replaced by new biological neurons.

I don't think anyone would argue that when one neuron dies, one's selfhood is lost and a new person is created. That is just silly. Therefore, at the very least, it should be possible to replace our neurons one by one and maintain whatever it is that creates one's selfhood.

Thus, since uploading certainly seems like a real possibility, it is a very desireable thing to work towards. Uploading would create a whole new world of possibilities that were never before dreamed of.  Here is just a glimpse of the possibilities:

One could easily modify and upgrade one's own cognitive efficiency, ability, and capacity.  One could slow down one's subjective perception of time. One could communicate using methods beyond what we are capable of today. One could engineer and experience amazing virtual realities.  The possibilities seem endless

Is the self the sum of an individual's neural activity? What effect does the process of replacement have on our memories? Is the neuron fully understood?

 

AggressiveProgressive:

Like many here, I am definitely of the opinion that our consciousness emerges from our neural processes, and since the matter in our brains is constantly changing, I see no reason why it would be impossible to upload oneself to another substrate. Functionally, replacing our biological neurons with artificial neurons is probably not much different than when old biological neurons die and are replaced by new biological neurons.

I don't think anyone would argue that when one neuron dies, one's selfhood is lost and a new person is created. That is just silly. Therefore, at the very least, it should be possible to replace our neurons one by one and maintain whatever it is that creates one's selfhood.

Thus, since uploading certainly seems like a real possibility, it is a very desireable thing to work towards. Uploading would create a whole new world of possibilities that were never before dreamed of.  Here is just a glimpse of the possibilities:

One could easily modify and upgrade one's own cognitive efficiency, ability, and capacity.  One could slow down one's subjective perception of time. One could communicate using methods beyond what we are capable of today. One could engineer and experience amazing virtual realities.  The possibilities seem endless

Anything is possible but we don't understand the brain well enough yet. I don't think that the prospects of uploading are good enough that we should use the possibility of uploading as a motivational factor, not at this time. I'd rather see focus on improving our understanding of the brain, concepts_of_self, and consciousness. First things first.

IMO : the self is a concept with unknown biological correlates - useful for distinquishing between individuals but also potentially misleading. One's subjective experience of the concept of self is likely very different from how others would perceive it. What we may think is our self, some would say is just an aspect of consciousness. Likewise, what others perceive to be our selves - we may think is just window dressing.

With regards to uploading, it may be better to ask : 'what is worth copying?'

Abolitionist:

With regards to uploading, it may be better to ask : 'what is worth copying?'

I like this.

Abolitionist:

Is the self the sum of an individual's neural activity? What effect does the process of replacement have on our memories? Is the neuron fully understood?

The self is the sum of an individual's neural activity, but it is a marvelous sum.

At this moment in time, science does not know enough to perfectly emulate a neuron.  In the future, I am sure that it is possible to fully understand a neuron, and therefore we could replace our neurons with no memory loss whatsoever.  We will probably use computer simulations and animal experiments first to get it right before we do it on humans.

Abolitionist:

Anything is possible but we don't understand the brain well enough yet. I don't think that the prospects of uploading are good enough that we should use the possibility of uploading as a motivational factor, not at this time. I'd rather see focus on improving our understanding of the brain, concepts_of_self, and consciousness. First things first.

IMO : the self is a concept with unknown biological correlates - useful for distinquishing between individuals but also potentially misleading. One's subjective experience of the concept of self is likely very different from how others would perceive it. What we may think is our self, some would say is just an aspect of consciousness. Likewise, what others perceive to be our selves - we may think is just window dressing.

With regards to uploading, it may be better to ask : 'what is worth copying?'

I don't mind using forward-looking potential scenarios as motivation for people.  It can make people more eager to become scientists and study science, which would help speed up the arrival of such scenarios. What, specifically, is wrong with using such positive outlooks as motivational tools?



In order to understand something like consciousness, the philosopher takes a top-down approach and the scientist takes a bottom-up approach.

A philosopher will try to create theories about qualia and what is the self.  A neurobiologist will study neurons and how they work together. The philosopher might come up with useful information, or at least flawed but productive memes. It might take scientists longer to come up with their theories, but through understanding the building blocks of the brain, scientists can give a good explanation of how something like consciousness emerges.

Philosophy can give meaning to all of this, but do not be mistaken, a bottom-up approach is the only way we can understand how the brain works.  Abolitionist, your statements seemed to suggest that we do not have enough of a philosophical (and biological) understanding in order to fully grasp consciousness.

I just want to make sure you know that the top-down approach, which includes such subjects as the "concept of self," and the bottom-up approach are not mutually exclusive in the least. Furthermore, no philosophy is required in order to study the interactions of neurons, and no knowledge of neurons is required in order to ponder about consciousness. I would argue though that a humanist perspective would help make sure scientific knowledge is used properly.

I really like the bottom-up approach because if scientists cannot get an accurate model of the brain on the neural level, they might go down to the atomic or sub-atomic levels.  Eventually though, by digging down far enough, we can understand how it works.

This reductionist approach to understanding intelligence is how I was first convinced that AI would be possible.  At the very least, it should be possible to simulate on a computer all of a person's neurons or atoms working together.

As for what is worth "copying" ... I don't like the term 'copying' for this purpose.  Moravec speculated that we would encase neurons in artifical shells that monitor the workings of the individual neurons, and then eventually take over their functions.  The term "copying" doesn't really apply, and thus everything in our brains needs to be transferred to a biological substrate.

If the being decides that certain memories or personality traits are undesireable, it can deal with them as it pleases after it is completely uploaded.

"Anything is possible but we don't understand the brain well enough yet. I don't think that the prospects of uploading are good enough that we should use the possibility of uploading as a motivational factor, not at this time. I'd rather see focus on improving our understanding of the brain..."

That is what the scientists are doing all the time, it is just that we should

"First things first."

Yes, well, however we do need to consider why we are doing what we are doing.

Abolitionist:

urchinstar47:

There are other people who will think differently. I am definitly one of them. I concider uploading to be the most important step in our evolution. I think that as an infomorph, I would have more freedom than in any other form.

similar to immersive virtual reality? I haven't seen the term infomorph before - could you elaborate?

No, not similar to immersive VR, more like AP said.

Infomorph is an uploaded inteligence, or, more generaly, an information entity, that resides inside a computer.

"I don't mind using forward-looking potential scenarios as motivation for people.  It can make people more eager to become scientists and study science, which would help speed up the arrival of such scenarios. What, specifically, is wrong with using such positive outlooks as motivational tools?"

I'm with you - it can be a positive motivational factor to have something to work towards - especially when it promises so much. My concern is that some become less happy from obsessing about something that may not happen in their lifetimes. If it happens, great. But don't expect anything like it to happen. I have a theory that the beneficial psychological process of coming to terms with the inevitability of one's death may be postponed by hoping for immortality.

I think that philosophy can help us make useful understanding of available knowledge.

"As for what is worth "copying" ... I don't like the term 'copying' for this purpose.  Moravec speculated that we would encase neurons in artifical shells that monitor the workings of the individual neurons, and then eventually take over their functions.  The term "copying" doesn't really apply, and thus everything in our brains needs to be transferred to a biological substrate.

If the being decides that certain memories or personality traits are undesireable, it can deal with them as it pleases after it is completely uploaded."

It's still a copy generated from an external point of view - the point of view we assign the artificial shells or other potential methods of monitoring.

"As it pleases" - yes, this sounds like a potentially easier method of removing the 'good' from 'bad.' Alot of what we consider to be ourselves would likely prove useless in an uploaded environment. What would motivate us when we are uploaded?

Although it is not impossible to live forever, the odds of living forever are approaching zero percent.  I don't know who would actually want to live for eternity, but even if that is one's goal it is such a mathematically remote (infinitely remote) possibility that it is not worth considering.  Every day people do things that have small odds of causing death, living forever makes it a near certainty that SOMETHING will kill you... maybe not for a long time, but even if one lives to be a million years old, that is still nowhere close to the unfathomable amount of time that is infinity.  Thus, anyone who hasn't come to terms with the fact that they will die eventually, even if they aspire to be posthuman, is being very irrational.


When we are uploaded, I would imagine that we would still be motivated to have interactions with other people (although it would be on much deeper levels than currently possible).  We would also be motivated to be happy, and have new experiences (in virtual and real worlds).  And finally, we would most certainly retain our curiosity, and seek out as much knowledge and wisdom as possible.

Possibility of living forever simply means that you are unlikely to die just becouse you reach some particular phase in your life. The question of true eternal life does not concern me in the near term, becouse there are numerous problems to overcome, no matter how you define the near term.

There is that aditional feature that comes with being an infomorph. Even if you die, or get killed, you can leave a backup copy that would, idealy, continue where you left things.

Urchinstar47 wrote, "There is that aditional feature that comes with being an infomorph. Even if you die, or get killed, you can leave a backup copy that would, idealy, continue where you left things."

This takes us back into the issue of selfhood. If this software creature were to fully merge and exchange memories with another software creature both creatures would for a brief instant be essentially identical, until experience cause them to diverge again.

Imagine a huge community of long lived software creatures repeatedly doing this for centuries. Aside from isolated, static backups, this is a kind of loss of identity. When you exchange memories with everyone, you loose yourself.

Some people might really like this hivemind like state. Others might find it appalling and refuse on principle to merge memories with anyone.

What takes us back to selfhood? I was not talking about merging and exchanging memories. The only reason to do this would be to sinchronise betwen two copies of myself.

I was simply talking about leaving backups around, just in case the worst should happen.