in Search
0 members online

Simon

An uplifting evening with James Hughes

This past Friday, James Hughes of the World Transhumanist Association (WTA) and Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (IEET) was in Toronto. He was a presenter at ideaCity, a neat gathering of eclectic leaders arranged each year in the city. After James’s participation in the event, I picked up him and his son, Tristan, and we drove up to George Dvorsky’s, where the red wine and wide-ranging conversation flowed.

Many people will know James from his superhuman promotion of democratic transhumanism. Besides being the driving force behind the WTA and the IEET, James is the author of Citizen Cyborg, the producer and host of Changesurfer Radio, and a Betterhumans columnist.

It’s always great to chat with James in person, especially when he, George and I have an opportunity to bat around ideas that aren’t common dinner-table conversation. This meeting was no exception, spanning everything from uplifting animals to James’s desire to eliminate human racism in UN human rights documents.

We devoted much of the evening to debating the ethics of uplifting animals—raising them to the level of human intelligence, and beyond. This was the topic of George’s talk at the recent IEET conference. According to James, the talk has been mentioned in pretty much every article written on the conference (including, notably, William Saletan’s piece in Slate). George is considering turning the talk into a book, and he has already drafted an essay for publication. (If you’d like to read it, I’m sure he’d oblige in exchange for feedback. Just drop him a note.)

I found myself playing devil’s advocate, as I’m not convinced that (1) uplifting animals is ethical and (2) we have the right criteria for deciding which animals get uplifted, should we pursue such a project.

My first objection stems from the fact that upgrading the intelligence of certain animals may cause them more harm than good. For example, if I beefed up my dog’s IQ to 140, without making any other psychological modifications, it’s not clear how he would be happier than he is right now. His current pleasures include peeing on all stationary vertical objects, chewing on dried cow penis and, sometimes, eating his own poo. And if I did make other psychological modifications, I wouldn’t have a dog anymore, let alone my dog.

George and James had two responses to this objection. First, they argue that we only uplift animals that pass certain personhood tests, such as the mirror test. This would include most great apes and some other creatures, including dolphins. Once again, however, it’s not clear to me that great apes and dolphins would be happier with greater intelligence. Their psychologies have evolved to receive pleasure from certain pursuits, and jacking up their intelligence without changing this pleasure wiring might cause more misery than happiness. But changing this pleasure wiring would change the creatures themselves. So we might not be uplifting apes and dolphins so much as destroying what made them apes and dolphins in the first place.

James’s objection to this line of argumentation centers on the example of a mentally disabled human. Are we not ethically obligated, he asks, to raise such a person’s mental functioning to the greatest degree possible? After all, he notes, we could argue that a mentally disabled human is happy in that capacity, and that adding intelligence would only make him or her less happy through the introduction of existential angst and other issues that come with higher cognitive abilities.

But while I agree that we are ethically obligated to uplift mentally disabled humans, I don’t believe that the same argument holds for animals. The key reason is that we know what it’s like to be an uplifted mentally disabled person. People with IQs in the normal range of distribution are, essentially, uplifted mentally disabled people. With animals, however, we have no precedent. We don’t know how an uplifted chimp would experience the world.

My counterproposals to uplifting projects are to increase respect for animals, and give them more opportunities to have less suffering. For example, let’s stop eating animals, and let’s spend resources developing vat-generated meat and dairy products. Let’s also start preserving more space for animals to live. And if we really want to improve animal happiness, let’s intervene in ways that reduce disease and reduce predatory and starvation pressures. (This last point, however, might also be contentious; by reducing selection pressures, we doom animals to stagnation and ultimate extinction unless we intervene through genetic engineering.) At the very least, let this be where we start. If uplifting does prove to be the right thing to do, at least we won’t be faced with animals that strongly question our ethics by pointing out that we treated them terribly until they were more like us.

And to address the risk that uplifting animals might cause them more harm than good, I also propos an experiment whereby animals could choose whether or not to get uplifted. Imagine, for example, that we developed agents for uplifting that could be embedded in food. We could then run an experiment whereby apes and other animals could select which food they preferred, the uplifting food or the regular food. Once they learned which food had the uplifting effect, they could continue eating the food as long as they were happy with the results.

James considers this proposal unethical, as he feels that—as with raising children—we’re obligated to do what’s right for uplift-eligible animals whether they like it or not. This, to me, is an unsatisfactory comparison, because with raising children (1) we know the endpoint, because we live it, and feel that our children would enjoy it and (2) children are headed towards greater intelligence regardless of what we do, so our job is to shape their experience to make their future as positive as possible for them and society. Apes are not headed for this degree of sophistication without our intervention; we’re not shaping their future, we’re dramatically altering it.

If all of this sounds off-the-wall, welcome to my evening. But besides debating the ethics of animal uplift, we also discussed the future of the WTA, the IEET and Betterhumans. Needless to say, James has big plans for the WTA and IEET, and will likely be unveiling a fresh agenda for both groups shortly. As for Betterhumans, we talked about its role in spreading transhumanist ideas, and its future role in centralizing transhumanist-themed discussion.

All in all, my evening with James and George didn’t disappoint, and I’m looking forward to seeing James again soon. In the meantime, I can work on polishing my uplift counterarguments. Perhaps I’ll confer with my dog—when, of course, his mouth isn’t full of poo.

Published Sunday, June 25, 2006 5:09 PM by Simon

Comment Notification

Join or sign in to track comments

Comments

 

Anne wrote on June 25, 2006 8:41 PM

I think that a lot of people use the term "IQ" without much knowledge of intelligence testing, and without acknowledging that the definition of what comprises intelligence is still quite vague.  The two main IQ tests utilized in neuropsychological evaluations are the Weschler Intelligence Scale (with versions for children and adults) and the Stanford-Binet.  Scoring scales are somewhat different on these tests, as are the structure of the tests themselves.  There is also another test called the Raven's Progressive Matrix, which relies primarily on a person's abilities in visual pattern recognition; this test has been championed as a means to bypass cultural bias in intelligence testing.  So, when someone says "intelligence" or "IQ", my first thought is, "according to which test?"

I've been corresponding with George somewhat on the "animal uplift" idea, and my current take on the matter is that, before taking actions to modify animal minds, we ought to do everything possible to communicate with them on their terms (since we're in a position of greater power in many ways) and find out what their wishes are.

In the case of humans, the question can be even more complex.  I will admit to being somewhat uncomfortable with the notion of "uplifting" supposedly cognitively disabled humans -- especially if we are basing determinations of intelligence on an IQ test score, or on expected social behavior.  As someone with an autistic spectrum diagnosis, I can describe quite a few ways in which my brain works that I find to be very useful, and that I appreciate.  For instance, I have always been completely "outside" the common need to "belong for the sake of belonging", and I am immune to certain forms of manipulative persuasion (such as techniques that make extensive use of common body language and facial expression), and I have never felt in the least tied down by traditional gender, class, or cultural roles.  Oh, and I also tend to notice a lot of things in movies and in daily life that many people miss, because I'm attuned to a different set of stimuli and sensory input.  My hearing is much more acute than that of most people; I can hear up to around 25,000 Hz.

Surely, this sort of neurology has a place in society, and I would resist any insistence that I be subject to a "cure" on the basis that I am somehow missing out on some integral part of the human experience.  Should I feel sorry for people who cannot hear sounds in the same range that I can?  Should I feel pity for people who are so distracted, during a movie, by the actors' body language that they fail to notice all the interesting street signs in the background, or the configuration of the control panel in a sci-fi film?  I somehow doubt so.

We need different kinds of people in the world, and different kinds of nonhuman persons, for the sake of maintaining checks and balances on group dominance -- and also for the sake of fostering innovation and societal complexity.  People need to be exposed to other beings that force them to question their base assumptions about, well, basically everything.

I'm not totally opposed to the idea of biological uplift, however, I do think that much care needs to be taken to assure that one dominant group does not assume that the base assumptions of that group constitute the best of all possible configurations of being.  Individual choice is a huge factor -- it could be that, given the opportunity, certain people and animals would choose various sorts of enhancement technologies that they believe would help them reach their goals.  For instance, I do take a prescription stimulant medication that helps me deal more effectively with interruptions -- basically, I've identified a particular area of cognitive ability that I prefer to keep at a  different level than my unadulterated brain provides.  

Taking this medication does not, however, turn me into a different person, whereas making my brain completely nonautistic would.  And it's likely that the fact that I spent my childhood observing minutiae and mechanisms and reading extensively rather than worrying about makeup and shopping or who had a crush on who is part of the reason I'm here posting on Betterhumans right now!  I hear people ask all the time, "Why aren't there more female transhumanists?"  Well, from some conversations I've had with other females who are enthusiastic about life extension and such, it's clear that being on the autistic spectrum seems to contribute to the likelihood of a female being interested in, and enthusiastic about, transhumanist notions.  This is something that should be carefully considered when talking about "cognitive disabilities" -- at what point does "uplift" cease to be benevolent and turn into an act meant to turn one person into a different person entirely?  And if the person in question is capable of communicating, will their wishes be respected or will they be assumed incapable of making their own decisions?

Intelligence, or cognitive ability, is not some general property of the brain -- different people have different areas of greatest ability, and different (but equally valid) modes of operating.  When it comes to sapient nonhumans, I would suggest that "uplift" should first focus on such things as health care equal to that provided to humans, up to and including longevity treatments.  I also, as I've mentioned in my blog and in communications with George, am curious about the notion of modifying *human* brains such that we are capable of interpreting animal communication and behavior more accurately.  This might enable us to meet on something of a common ground prior to any sort of biological alteration of such animals.  Who knows -- we may find that they feel sorry for *us*!
 

George wrote on June 25, 2006 9:53 PM

Simon, what a wonderful recap of the night. We were able to cover so much in so little time. Forums like BH are a godsend, but personal interaction still goes a long way.

Some quick retorts:

You wrote: "His current pleasures include peeing on all stationary vertical objects, chewing on dried cow penis and, sometimes, eating his own poo. And if I did make other psychological modifications, I wouldn’t have a dog anymore, let alone my dog."

Simon, while I'm not necessarily opposed to companion animals, you don't have a *right* to a pet, nor to force your pet to maintain a limited cognitive level or prescribed psychology to suit your needs. Moreover, if you were taking care of a disabled human whose pleasures consisted of peeing on all stationary vertical objects, chewing on dried cow penis and eating their own poo, I think you'd consider it to be a problem.

I can already feel your objection, which would be to say that it's in the dog's nature to like those things, but not in a human's. What I would say to that is that i) you're making a false justification by drawing the species boundry, and ii) making a false assumption that one's "nature" is good and normal. Our "nature" is merely the psychological wiring that defined us at birth and is a part of our evolutionary baggage.

By human standards, a dog's "nature," if imposed on a human, would be a life of indignity. Why, therefore, couldn't we conclude that a dog's life is undignified?

As I explore this issue, I am finding that arguments against often rely on calling the species card -- as in, "you can't do that because it's another species," or "you can't compare human needs and desires to those of other species," etc. Each time such a remark is made, a qualitative claim needs to be made to justify such statements as, "while x is good and desireable for our species, x is not good and desireable for another species." It is for this very reason that I am finding much efficacy in drawing analogies to severely disabled humans.
 

Anne wrote on June 25, 2006 11:09 PM

George:  I realize you're writing here to Simon and not me, but I'm very interested in this conversation and hope my comments do not comprise unwelcome butting in.

I understand the analogy to severely disabled humans, however, I definitely think that people need to be equally careful here in assuming what constitutes an indignity.  Because any one of us might have a problem with something someone else is doing that doesn't automatically mean that the thing the other person (or animal) is doing is piteous or in need of remediation.

A few generations ago, a lot of people might have had a big problem with the notion of women attending college, choosing not to have children, or working outside the home -- the fact that some women wanted (and worked toward) achieving these things did not make these women "tragic" or in need of "uplift" toward a state of "pure and traditional womanhood".  

If we'd been more technologically advanced several generations ago, it's possible that those in power might have considered it a good idea to make sure girl babies are mentally configured to prefer traditional gender roles, on the basis that not feeling compelled to follow traditional roles represented an undignified state.  Diverging from typical or expected behavior or preferences has often been cause for certain things to be diagnosed as mental disorders, when in fact, the issue has been a problem of perspective.  Homosexuality used to be considered a mental illness, and people who preferred same-sex partners were most certainly considered "limited" and tragic.  

I know that there are real and profound disabilities and diseases that should be addressed on the basis that they could seriously inhibit a person's lifespan or overall health, however, we need to remain cognizant of the fact that sometimes mere deviance from a norm looks a lot like disability when one is operating from a particular set of base assumptions.  I'm not a "disability extremist" but rather a realist who recognizes the inherent neutrality of certain biological and cognitive traits.  Notice I say "certain" and not "all".  

There are certainly some configurations that are very detrimental to a person's ability to survive and thrive as an individual, but the fact that some neutral-but-atypical configurations have been considered tragic disabilities or disorders in the past means that it is very important to carefully examine any aspect of a person that prompts a knee-jerk reaction of "oh, how terrible!"  Knee-jerk reactions aren't rational thought.

My own arguments have absolutely nothing to do with the fact of something being "natural" -- there are quite a few things in nature that are perfectly horrid, and there are plenty of aspects of my "natural" self I'd love to intervene with (such as senescence!).

When assessing the appropriateness of an action or intervention, the question of whether something is the way it is by chance or by sentient intent should be irrelevant.  States of being need to be evaluated on their own merits, not on the basis of how these states were established.  
 

sardion2000 wrote on June 26, 2006 4:32 AM

I don't think we, as a species are wise enough to responsibly "uplift" another species to something approaching our intellect. One major reason is that we will most likely abuse this ability to make a slave race. One thats just smart enough to clean your car, wash your dishes and clean your laundry, but not much else.

The Prime Directive would apply here if we were bound by the laws of the Federation. Outside interference, no matter how well intentioned, always has a good chance of our Culture damaging another Culture through sheer ignorance. I know this mainly applies to sentient species on other worlds in the Fiction of Star Trek, but I think the same should apply here.

Since animals like Dogs, Cats, and Cows are intertwined into our culture, they are apart of our Culture already and wouldn't be as meddling as would abducting some Apes from the wild, smartening them up and then releasing them back into the wild. Certain things should just be left to chance. We've meddled enough already with the Natural Order of things, lets try to return our world to a state somewhat resembling what it was before we came around.

If we are destined to become Immortal, then isn't a great disservice to future Evolutionary Biologists to start unilaterily taking the evolution of other species not directly connected to our own, into our selfish and mistake prone hands?

Just think of how much we could learn by just leaving it alone and observe for the next 10 thousand years.....

My own Philosphy of Transhumanism goes like this: One cannot force another to "Upgrade themselves." Concious written consent by an Adult is required.

It's okay to upgrade your own body or prevent debilitating or lethal illnesses of your children, but unilaterily upgrading your unborn child with "selfish, frivolous" upgrade is immoral. Everyone has to choose for themselves how they are to Transform themselves...or not to transform themselves.
 

Simon wrote on June 26, 2006 11:49 AM

George, as you know, I'm not outright against uplifting. I just haven't been convinced that it is the ethical thing to do, not to mention that it's the best use of our resources.

Nydra and sardion2000 have made some excellent points here. In addition, I would add:

(1) Where do you draw the line? If your argument is that only animals that pass personhood tests should be uplifting, that's one thing. But if you think we need to save all *creatures* from nasty, brutish and short lives, that's a lot of organisms. If you're arguing, as you appear to above, that we should uplift organisms that seem to have undignified lives based on human criteria, then where does it stop? Dung beetles roll in shit all day, which we would consider undignified. Should they be uplifted?

(2) What about consent? If I were to seek an intelligence uplift from a doctor through some sort of procedure, I would need to indicate informed consent. Your argument is that we don't need such consent from animals in the same way we don't need consent from children for health-inducing medical procedures such as vaccinations, and intelligence enhancing interventions such as school. But the reason we don't need consent from children is because we have evidence that we're acting *in their best interest* -- we know that without our intervention they will become diseased dropouts. So the question is: if you are going to bypass the need for animal consent, what evidence do you have that being uplifted is in animals' best interest?
 

George wrote on June 26, 2006 3:52 PM

Hey Gang: Some retorts.

Nydra: re: dignity and disability -- I realize that dignity may be a culturally normative concept and that it may reside in the eye of the beholder, but I'm describing those *basic* needs that any rational agent would choose for themselves given the availability of those primary goods that would satiate those needs. As I describe in my paper, by using the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, while including sentient nonhumans in the sample of individuals who find themselves in the original position, we stand a better chance of reasoning out what nonhumans would choose for themselves given the opportunity (ie the availability of uplift technologies).

As for disability rights, I hear what you're saying, but sometimes a disability is exactly that. Do you agree that deaf parents should be allowed to genetically alter their children so that they may join deaf culture--which many deaf individuals value over hearing society? As for autistics, while I'm partial to the idea of autistic rights and the attendant benefits of that condition, there's no question that autistics are quite clearly losing out on alternative aspects of social existence and even conscious experience itself.

Sardion2000: "re: Just think of how much we could learn by just leaving it alone and observe for the next 10 thousand years....." -- Like animal experimentation, the ends don't always justify the means. Moreover, passivity and indifference can also be interpreted as negligence and a shirking of our moral obligations.

Simon: re: (1) Where do you draw the line? -- like we discussed on Fri, I would initially start with highly sapient nonhumans, including the great apes, cetaceans and elephants. While I think a case can be made to move beyond that, I'm not going to venture down that path quite yet. The reason for drawing an arbitray line is political and because most people involved in animal rights are inclined to agree on.

re: (2) What about consent? -- have you read my paper yet? in it I describe how the Rawlsian original position experiment can give us consent by proxy (which I pretty much describe above).

For those who want to read my paper, I'm reluctant to post it on the Web because it's still in draft form. I'd be glad to send it out on a individual basis -- email me at george@betterhumans.com if you'd like to critique a copy.
 

Simon wrote on June 26, 2006 4:04 PM

Perhaps now *would* be a good time to read your latest draft :) I will do my best to refrain from further criticisms until I have done so.
 

sardion2000 wrote on June 26, 2006 5:03 PM

George Said:
"Moreover, passivity and indifference can also be interpreted as negligence and a shirking of our moral obligations."

You paraphrasing Bush now? I keeed, I keeed. ;) I never liked this argument, as it can be used to support nearly every position no matter how immoral/illigal/etc. But NEways.......

Take a gander at our collective history.

Whenever some group of Humans unilaterally decided to go and interfere with another group of Humans, no matter what their intentions were, the results were usually bad.

The most apt example of this is still clearly evident in Caledonia, Ontario.

There are exceptions of course, but unfortunately they are few and far between.

Passive? Definately the best way to go IMO. I've been a Pacifist for as long as I can remember, so the hand-off approach appeals to me.

Indifferent? Never... Indifference would be a very bad thing. It would cause us to stop caring about all the crap we put up into the atmosphere, thusly interfering with every lifeform on this planet, and in my fictional Prime Directive, our actions now with all the Polluting and Clear cutting and the draining of wetlands would be a grave breach of that Directive. We are already interfering on a wide-spread scale with unknown and unknowable consequences. Nature has shown that it is much healthier and diverse when our influence is at a minimum.

When looking into the Future Ethical quandraries, it's very helpful and essential that we pay attention to history.

As for Animal Experimentation in general, I believe it should be abolished ASAP. That is, as soon as Computer Simulations become a superior tool.
 

Anne wrote on June 26, 2006 9:05 PM

George said: "there's no question that autistics are quite clearly losing out on alternative aspects of social existence and even conscious experience itself. "

I think it is something of a mistake to suggest that the quality and scope of a person's consciousness can be determined on the basis of whether they are autistic or not.  From my experience, quality of consciousness (if defined as a person's satisfaction with their sensations of being aware, their ability to meet their own intellectual goals, and their ability to experience happiness and comfort) seems to vary greatly between individuals, regardless of whether they've been diagnosed with anything in particular.  

For instance, I've encountered plenty of nonautistic people who seem to never think of anything beyond their daily work-home-watch TV routine, and who never question their religion, and who scoff at the idea that anyone might want to live more than 70 years -- I'd certainly consider this a limited form of consciousness, but I don't think I can blame this limitation on the neurotypicality of those in question.

I realize that this is probably outside the scope of this discussion and I don't want to needlessly distract from the matter of animal uplift, but I did feel compelled to at least respond to the notion that autistics are somehow losting out on some aspects of conscious experience itself.

I'm really curious as to how a person could come to this conclusion.  I remember at one point in high school being completely baffled as to why my classmates had zero interest in what consciousness was, how humans got here, and what it meant to be human, or to be a person.  

This was the sort of thing I was thinking about regularly as a child and adolescent; one of my primary fixations during my teen years was that of trying to come up with a coherent definition of personhood.  

I'm hugely enthused to have encountered the transhumanist movement in part because it has provided a means to discuss this very question.  Clearly, having AS does not in any way diminish the quality of my subjective experience of consciousness.  I don't even know how it's possible to look at, or even interact with, a person and make the determination that your experience of conscious existence is somehow superior.  

About the only things I could imagine really impacting a person's experience of consciousness would be depression (in the clinical sense), pathological anxiety, difficulty maintaining consciousness (as in the case of narcolepsy), or being in a state of constant and unrelenting physical pain.  In all cases listed here, consciousness is invaded upon and interrupted by phenomena that may end up preventing a person from being able to think deep thoughts (due to the interruptions) or experience prolonged happiness or comfort.  

The most consciousness-disrupting experience I've ever had was a bad toothache.  I definitely know the subjective difference between "good" conscious experience (which is rich and deep and wonderful) and "bad" conscious experience (which seems to disrupt my sense of self, continuity, and ability to learn).  But my "baseline" consciousness is, arguably, very high quality -- I wouldn't be a life-extension advocate if that were otherwise!

But, back to the matter of animal uplift: I do agree that using the notion of Original Position does indeed allow us to circumvent the issue of consent, provided that the animals in question are defined as persons.  If something is good for persons because these persons are sentient, then obviously it wouldn't make sense to draw species lines (which, in my mind, become as arbitrary as lines drawn on the basis of national origin or ethnicity at that point).  

Your greatest challenge, perhaps, in your paper is to make the case that original position is a sufficiently powerful concept such that it enables humans to circumvent consent -- perhaps on the basis that certain things can be proven to be positive for creatures that are sufficiently human-like.  If we can identify to a certain (as yet undefined) extent -- socially, intellectually, culturally -- with a given group of nonhuman animals, then it certainly seems plausible that our ideas of what is good for them might be more in line with theirs, though there is really no way to know this absolutely.
 

Anne wrote on June 26, 2006 9:30 PM

Ack, I now realize I might have contradicted myself by first suggesting that there were people who, to me, seemed to have limited conscious experience and then stating that I didn't know how it was possible to make such a determination.  I think that such determinations are semi-subjective -- but I also think that one might make a case that some experiences are different, and possibly mutually exclusive, and yet at the same time equally valid.  

For example, I would suggest that being ignorant of, say, evolutionary theory might make it more comfortable for a person to believe in special creation (thereby granting a sort of existential security), however, I would argue that this form of ignorance would be limiting and potentially capable of preventing a person from experiencing the beauty of being able to exercise their rational faculties to question long-held dogmas.   This would be a case of me making a subjective determination regarding an ignorant state versus a more informed state: I would suggest that being informed is "better than" being ignorant.

However, consider now the example of two people who pursue different occupations.  One becomes an artist and the other becomes a dentist.    In order to fully experience the depth and scope of these respective professions, each must devote considerable brain real estate to their chosen field, which necessarily means they are limiting the amount of real estate that can be spent on other pursuits.  Would it make sense for these two people to mutually pity one another?  In my mind, no.  Each is pursuing somethat that, for whatever reason, fulfills them and allows for a rich experience of consciousness.

I suppose the argument could be made that certain neurological configurations might hinder a person's ability to choose their path in life, however, what makes some people want to become artists and some people want to become dentists?  It's clear that there is something in their neurological and personality makeup that drives them toward one direction or another.  About the only case in which I think the limitation-of-choice argument might apply would be one in which a person really WANTS to do a particular thing and finds that they cannot without some form of augmentation.  

Also: with regard to the question of whether Deaf parents are justified in wanting to bear a Deaf child -- I would say that they're just as justified as anyone who wants to make their child taller than average, shorter than average, blonde as opposed to brunette, etc.  (That is: justification is perhaps questionable but I wouldn't suggest legislating against it).  Deafness doesn't cause limited lifespan or ill health in general, so it might be argued to be a neutral characteristic, but something of an arbitrary one.  

I don't see the point of meddling with characteristics that don't directly relate to physical health and viability; after all, regardless of what a parent chooses for their child beyond the capacity for survival, could always end up being rejected by the child later on.  (A Deaf-born child could presumably choose treatments later in life that would enable him / her to hear, or a child configured to become a star footballer might instead choose to become a florist).
 

Mr. Farlops wrote on June 27, 2006 12:19 AM

I think I'm mostly in agreement with Nydra and George. We shouldn't attempt to boost the intelligence, and I define intelligence as broadly as possible in this case, of organisms that haven't asked for such.

But the problem then becomes how can we ask people and creatures we can't communicate with. At some point on the spectrum it becomes pointless to try.

For example, suppose we build some kind of apparatus that allows us to communicate directly with ants. What we discover is that that their language is so simple that human concepts can't map to it.

I'll go out on a limb here and say that ant hives are incapable of asking, "We feel inadequate and strive for something greater. Will you help us?" And if they can't ask, should we mess with them?
 

Acrinoe wrote on June 27, 2006 7:30 AM

If the actual method is reversible, then proxy consent wouldn't be needed.  Uplift, ask, reverse if requested.

My bigger question is: what is our motivation here?  Doing it because we can?  Providing all the benefits (and angst) of intelligence to all?  Taking diversity (and the resultant competition) to new levels?  

Another point:  Assuming dogs, chimps, dophins, etc would adopt human style ethics, morals, etc. may be quite false.  What if an uplifted, say wolf, decides it would prefer to remain a preditor, that can now use its intelligence to tackle bigger prey....like humans.  

 

EschewObfuscation wrote on June 27, 2006 2:04 PM

A thought: you're not modifying an already conscious being, you're creating a new conscious being. How is this substantially different than creating a new human? Is it unethical to bear a child because s/he hasn't asked to exist? The real problem would come in the form of quality-of-life considerations, e.g. will the only intelligent member of a new species have a life worth living? What about if you create 100 at the same time?
 

Mr. Farlops wrote on June 27, 2006 5:52 PM

This reminds me of that Futurama episode where Professor Farnsworth boosts the intelligence of a chimpanzee in order to win the accolades of his scientific comrades. In another episode a hive mind of alien parasites optimize Fry's brain  to boost his intelligence.

In both episodes the characters reject the benefits of hightened intelligence. For the chimp, greater intelligence only brings alienation. For Fry, greater intelligence causes him to question what Leela has fallen in love with.

It seems to me the alienation problem could be solved if the boosted chimps had others of their kind to commisserate and share with.

I'm not so clear on Fry's motivations for rejecting his greater intelligence though. Maybe he thought it was cheating.
 

Anne wrote on June 27, 2006 9:50 PM

Mr. Farlops said: "It seems to me the alienation problem could be solved if the boosted chimps had others of their kind to commisserate and share with. "

This is an excellent point.  And it applies to the comments I was making earlier about alternate neurologies -- I didn't have much in common with my classmates as a child and had zero RL friends in 6th grade, but I was NOT lonely or tragic -- by that time I'd already discovered the online world of "electronic bulletin boards", where I was able to find ready-made conversation partners who had already sorted themselves along interest lines!  I don't think that loneliness means there is something inherently wrong with anyone's brain; it could just mean they haven't found anyone they share enough with so as to relate to them enough to form a friendship.
Join or sign in to post a comment
Submit

About Simon

I aim to understand, apply and develop science, technology and communications to achieve positive change. To this end, I am the owner and operator of Betterhumans, which I founded in 2002. I also work in interactive healthcare marketing, helping pharmaceutical and other healthcare organizations effectively use interactive technologies. Currently, I'm also working part-time on a masters degree at the University of Toronto in the history and philosophy of science and technology.
Advertise | Help | Contact | About | Terms | Privacy | Copyright © 2007 Betterhumans | Powered by Community Server | Partners:
World Transhumanist Association Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies Immortality Institute Methuselah Mouse Prize Foresight Institute Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Lifeboat Foundation