This past
Friday, James
Hughes
of the
World Transhumanist Association
(WTA) and
Institute for Ethics and Emerging
Technologies (IEET) was in Toronto. He was a presenter at
ideaCity, a neat gathering of eclectic
leaders arranged each year in the city. After James’s participation in the
event, I picked up him and his son, Tristan, and we drove up to
George Dvorsky’s,
where the red wine and wide-ranging conversation flowed.
Many people
will know James from his superhuman promotion of democratic transhumanism. Besides
being the driving force behind the WTA and the IEET, James is the author of Citizen Cyborg, the
producer and host of Changesurfer Radio,
and a Betterhumans columnist.
It’s always
great to chat with James in person, especially when he, George and I have an
opportunity to bat around ideas that aren’t common dinner-table conversation. This
meeting was no exception, spanning everything from uplifting animals to James’s
desire to eliminate human racism in UN human rights documents.
We devoted
much of the evening to debating the ethics of uplifting animals—raising them to
the level of human intelligence, and beyond. This was the topic of George’s talk
at the recent IEET conference.
According to James, the talk has been mentioned in pretty much every article
written on the conference (including, notably, William
Saletan’s piece in Slate). George
is considering turning the talk into a book, and he has already drafted an
essay for publication. (If you’d like to read it, I’m sure he’d oblige in exchange
for feedback. Just drop
him a note.)
I found
myself playing devil’s advocate, as I’m not convinced that (1) uplifting
animals is ethical and (2) we have the right criteria for deciding which
animals get uplifted, should we pursue such a project.
My first
objection stems from the fact that upgrading the intelligence of certain
animals may cause them more harm than good. For example, if I beefed up my dog’s
IQ to 140, without making any other psychological modifications, it’s not clear
how he would be happier than he is right now. His current pleasures include
peeing on all stationary vertical objects, chewing on dried cow penis and,
sometimes, eating his own poo. And if I did make other psychological
modifications, I wouldn’t have a dog anymore, let alone my dog.
George and
James had two responses to this objection. First, they argue that we only
uplift animals that pass certain personhood tests, such as the mirror test. This
would include most great apes and some other creatures, including dolphins.
Once again, however, it’s not clear to me that great apes and dolphins would be
happier with greater intelligence. Their psychologies have evolved to receive
pleasure from certain pursuits, and jacking up their intelligence without
changing this pleasure wiring might cause more misery than happiness. But
changing this pleasure wiring would change the creatures themselves. So we might
not be uplifting apes and dolphins so much as destroying what made them apes
and dolphins in the first place.
James’s
objection to this line of argumentation centers on the example of a mentally
disabled human. Are we not ethically obligated, he asks, to raise such a person’s
mental functioning to the greatest degree possible? After all, he notes, we
could argue that a mentally disabled human is happy in that capacity, and that
adding intelligence would only make him or her less happy through the
introduction of existential angst and other issues that come with higher
cognitive abilities.
But while I
agree that we are ethically obligated to uplift mentally disabled humans, I don’t
believe that the same argument holds for animals. The key reason is that we know what it’s like to be an uplifted
mentally disabled person. People with IQs in the normal range of
distribution are, essentially, uplifted mentally disabled people. With animals,
however, we have no precedent. We don’t know how an uplifted chimp would
experience the world.
My
counterproposals to uplifting projects are to increase respect for animals, and
give them more opportunities to have less suffering. For example, let’s stop
eating animals, and let’s spend resources developing vat-generated meat and
dairy products. Let’s also start preserving more space for animals to live. And
if we really want to improve animal happiness, let’s intervene in ways that reduce
disease and reduce predatory and starvation pressures. (This last point,
however, might also be contentious; by reducing selection pressures, we doom
animals to stagnation and ultimate extinction unless we intervene through
genetic engineering.) At the very least, let this be where we start. If
uplifting does prove to be the right thing to do, at least we won’t be faced
with animals that strongly question our ethics by pointing out that we treated them
terribly until they were more like us.
And to
address the risk that uplifting animals might cause them more harm than good, I
also propos an experiment whereby animals could choose whether or not to get
uplifted. Imagine, for example, that we developed agents for uplifting that
could be embedded in food. We could then run an experiment whereby apes and
other animals could select which food they preferred, the uplifting food or the
regular food. Once they learned which food had the uplifting effect, they could
continue eating the food as long as they were happy with the results.
James considers
this proposal unethical, as he feels that—as with raising children—we’re
obligated to do what’s right for uplift-eligible animals whether they like it
or not. This, to me, is an unsatisfactory comparison, because with raising
children (1) we know the endpoint, because we live it, and feel that our
children would enjoy it and (2) children are headed towards greater
intelligence regardless of what we do, so our job is to shape their experience
to make their future as positive as possible for them and society. Apes are not
headed for this degree of sophistication without our intervention; we’re not
shaping their future, we’re dramatically altering it.
If all of
this sounds off-the-wall, welcome to my evening. But besides debating the ethics
of animal uplift, we also discussed the future of the WTA, the IEET and
Betterhumans. Needless to say, James has big plans for the WTA and IEET, and will
likely be unveiling a fresh agenda for both groups shortly. As for
Betterhumans, we talked about its role in spreading transhumanist ideas, and
its future role in centralizing transhumanist-themed discussion.
All in all,
my evening with James and George didn’t disappoint, and I’m looking forward to seeing
James again soon. In the meantime, I can work on polishing my uplift counterarguments.
Perhaps I’ll confer with my dog—when, of course, his mouth isn’t full of poo.